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Abstract Even though there is a high degree of
scientiﬁc uncertainty about the risks of nanotechnol-
ogy, many scholars have argued that policy-making
cannot be placed on hold until risk assessments are
complete (Faunce, Med J Aust 186(4):189–191, 2007;
Kuzma, J Nanopart Res 9(1):165–182, 2007; O’Brien
and Cummins, Hum Ecol Risk Assess 14(3):568–592,
2008; Powell et al., Environ Manag 42(3):426–443,
2008). In the absence of risk assessment data, decision
makers often rely on scientists’ input about risks and
regulation to make policy decisions. The research we
presentheregoesbeyondtheearlierdescriptivestudies
about nanotechnology regulation to explore the heu-
ristics that the leading U.S. nanoscientists use when
they make policydecisionsabout regulatingnanotech-
nology. In particular, we explore the relationship
between nanoscientists’ risk and beneﬁt perceptions
andtheirsupportfornanotechregulation.Weconclude
that nanoscientists are more supportive of regulating
nanotechnology when they perceive higher levels
of risks; yet, their perceived beneﬁts about
nanotechnology do not signiﬁcantly impact their
support for nanotech regulation. We also ﬁnd some
gender and disciplinary differences among the nano-
scientists. Males are less supportive of nanotech
regulation than their female peers and materials
scientists are more supportive of nanotechnology
regulation than scientists in other ﬁelds. Lastly, our
ﬁndings illustrate that the leading U.S. nanoscientists
see the areas of surveillance/privacy, human enhance-
ment, medicine, and environment as the nanotech
application areas that are most in need of new
regulations.
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Some scholars have argued that nanotechnology is the
deﬁning technology of the twenty-ﬁrst century (Bes-
ley et al. 2008; Bowman and Hodge 2006; Chau et al.
2007; Renn and Roco 2006). Regardless of whether
this statement will be true over the long term, there is
no denying that the use of nanotechnology has
inﬁltrated a variety of products and commercial
applications within the ﬁelds of biotechnology, elec-
tronics, and healthcare, among others. Even though
technology transfer appears to be alive and well
within the ﬁeld of nanotech, policy discussions about
the social, political, and ethical implications remain
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Only recently have social scientists and policy-makers
started to pay attention to the social dimensions of
nanotechnology research, particularly within the con-
text of how we might regulate it (Besley et al. 2008;
Cobb and Macoubrie 2004; Friedman and Egolf 2005;
Gewin 2006; Scheufele and Lewenstein 2005; Schum-
mer and Baird 2006). In addition, most previous
studies that have focused on the regulation of
nanotechnology have used descriptive analyses or
have tended to focus on normative suggestions for
adapting or reforming the existing regulation system
(Renn and Roco 2006).
The research presented here goes beyond the
earlier descriptive studies about nanotechnology
regulation to explore the way leading U.S. nanosci-
entists make policy decisions about regulating nano-
technology. Some scholars have explored mental
shortcuts and heuristics among scientists (Magnus
1997; Samarapungavan, Westby and Bodner 2006)
and how they can lead to perceptual biases about
regulation (Sunstein 2005). This literature, however,
is sparse, and no studies—to our knowledge—have
explored the heuristics that the leading U.S. nanosci-
entists use when they make policy decisions about the
regulation of the ﬁeld.
We, therefore, start our analysis by looking at
similar studies that have been conducted for the U.S.
public. Scheufele and Lewenstein (2005) found that in
thefaceofincompleteinformation,thepublicrelieson
a series of heuristics to make decisions about nano-
technology. In particular, they found that the public
tends to rely on perceptions of beneﬁts, shaped by
interpretive frames offered by mass media, when
making these policy decisions (for an overview, see
Scheufele(2006)).Alongwiththepublic,scientistsare
also members of the audience for different public
discourses about emerging technologies. Iyengar
(1991) showed that highly involved audiences are
often highly attentive to relevant media outlets and
therefore more susceptible to heuristics and other cues
provided by these news sources. This includes cues
provided by elite and mass media about how emerging
technologies are being framed with respect to their
risks and beneﬁts. It could be argued, of course, that
scientists have high levels of technical expertise about
issues related to science and technology and are
thereforelesssusceptibletopotentialmediainﬂuences.
In the absence of scientiﬁc certainty, scholars have
found that scientists often rely on heuristics or
normative values in the same way that lay people
do to make policy decisions (Carr and Levidow 2000;
Frank 1988; Silva and Jenkins-Smith 2007; Snider-
man et al. 1991; Zaller 1992). Thus, given the high
level of scientiﬁc uncertainty about the current risks
and beneﬁts of nanotech (Chau et al. 2007; Friedrichs
and Schulte 2007; Gewin 2006; Powell et al. 2008;
Rickerby 2007), we expect that there are other
heuristics that scientists use to make decisions about
nanotechnology regulations. For example, we assume
that nanoscientists have much higher levels of
knowledge than the public about the risks and
potential beneﬁts of nanotechnology. Therefore, we
expect that their expertise-based perceptions of risks
and beneﬁts will be the key factors that they will use
to make decisions about the regulation of the ﬁeld.
Policy environment
Having systematic and generalizable data about
perceptions among nanoscientists is increasingly
important, given the continued scarcity of conclusive
data on the environmental and health risks related to
nanomaterials (European Food Safety Authority
2009), and policy-making in this area cannot be
placed on hold until risk assessments are complete
(Faunce 2007; Kuzma 2007; O’Brien and Cummins
2008; Powell et al. 2008). While nanoscientists
continue to move their research forward and learn
more about the health and environmental risks of
nanotechnology, policy-makers are trying to deter-
mine the best way to formulate new regulations under
high levels of scientiﬁc uncertainty about the risks
and beneﬁts of the ﬁeld. In this type of scientiﬁc,
political, and regulatory environment, policy-makers
often have to rely on scientists’ perceptions about
risks and beneﬁts while they wait for the accumula-
tion of policy-relevant risk assessment data. Since
policy-makers do not yet have access to many
quantitative (and validated) risk assessment studies
for nanotechnology, the risk perceptions of nanosci-
entists will likely play an important role in develop-
ing short-term regulatory frameworks. After all, these
scientists are probably more familiar with the risks
and potential beneﬁts of nanotechnology than anyone
else because they work daily with nanomaterials in
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research that is used to develop new commercial
products.
Despitethedifﬁcultiesofthispolicyenvironment,it
is not a new situation for policy-makers. Nanotech-
nology is not the ﬁrst emerging technology that has
presented policy-makers with the task of developing
regulations without high levels of scientiﬁc certainty
abouttherisksandbeneﬁtsofthetechnology.Asimilar
regulatory environment occurred for climate change,
geneticallymodiﬁedorganisms(GMOs),andstemcell
research—all technological areas where scientiﬁc
uncertainty is relatively high. In these cases, we have
also seen policy-makers rely on scientists’ risk per-
ceptions and judgments when risk assessment data
were lacking. For example, Carr and Levidow (2000)
have argued that in the case of GMOs, high levels of
scientiﬁc uncertainty have led to policy decisions that
have been based on scientists’ professional judgment
more than actual scientiﬁc evidence. As Silva and
Jenkins-Smith (2007, p. 640) have argued ‘‘when
policies concern risks and risk management, scientists
maybecalledontoexercisejudgmentinextendingless
than certain scientiﬁc ﬁndings into policy recommen-
dations (Jasanoff 1990; McGarity 1978–1979; Revkin
2004; Salter et al. 1988).’’
Clearly, the high level of scientiﬁc uncertainty
involved in evaluating the risks and beneﬁts of
nanotechnology has complicated the development
and implementation of regulations both in the USA
and internationally (Franco et al. 2007). In spite of
these complications, policy-makers and regulatory
agencies have started to make progress on developing
policies that can protect the public from the risks of
nanotechnology. As they continue to make new
policies (and reﬁne existing ones), they will continue
to rely on scientists’ judgments and opinions about
both risk assessment and risk management. We
conclude this article with some policy implications
that will be useful for regulators and policy-makers, as
they attempt to include scientists in their development
of new regulatory frameworks for nanotechnology.
Scientists’ views on regulation
Within the academic literature, there are several
factors that might impact scientists’ perceptions
about the regulation of their ﬁeld. In this section,
we brieﬂy discuss the factors that are most relevant
for our study.
Regulation of nanotechnology
Even though the regulation of nanotechnology is a
relatively new topic for the policy-making commu-
nity, social science scholars are increasingly calling
for the regulation of the ﬁeld (Powell et al. 2008).
Bowman and Hodge (2006) argued that there have
been few debates about the social, ethical, and
regulatory aspects of nanotechnology. They con-
cluded that there is a regulatory gap between
commercial applications and public expectations
about regulatory protections for nanotechnology. In
fact, some scholars are encouraging industry to take
on a form of self-regulation until governmental
regulations are in place, and this regulatory gap is
closed (Lee and Jose 2008; Reinert et al. 2006).
The nature of nanotechnology makes it difﬁcult for
one agency to regulate all nano research and appli-
cations. Therefore, multiple federal agencies regulate
products that may employ nanotechnology or nanom-
aterials, but there is no comprehensive regulatory
framework. With this piecemeal approach, it is likely
that certain technologies or products will not be fully
regulated by any agency. Even though the FDA, for
instance, typically regulates cosmetic products ‘‘the
agency may have limited authority over the use of
nanotechnology related to those products’’ (FDA
2009). In the case of cosmetics, there is ‘‘no
premarket approval of cosmetic products or their
ingredients, with the exception of color additives’’
(FDA 2009). There are potential risks associated with
the use of nanomaterials in these types of products,
however, and the FDA says that it is ‘‘currently not
aware of any safety concerns,’’ but is ‘‘planning
additional studies to examine the effects of select
nanoparticles on skin penetration’’ (FDA 2009). In
the meantime, consumers continue to buy cosmetics
and sunscreens that may contain nanomaterials
without a clear indication of the potential risks and
without a comprehensive regulatory framework in
place. Yet, as Berube (2008) has argued, not all of
these products pose unknown or high levels of risks
for consumers. The larger problem in this example is
that there is not a clear regulatory framework in place
that provides consistent and comprehensive screening
and protection for consumers.
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complexity of nanotechnology has challenged exist-
ing regulatory frameworks. Not only are current
regulatory frameworks not designed to address
nanotechnology research, but also the progress of
risk assessment research in the ﬁeld of nanotechnol-
ogy is lagging behind the development of new
products. Therefore, an additional issue facing sci-
entists, the public, and policy-makers is how to
regulate a technology that we know relatively little
about in terms of potential human health and
environmental impacts. These challenges are com-
pounded by the fact that there is not much risk
assessment data that can be used to develop nano-
technology regulation at this stage. Thus, the com-
plexities of this policy case will require active
involvement by the scientists that conduct research
on nanomaterials. These are the scientists that we
include in the survey results presented here and we
explore the factors that they use to form policy
stances about the regulation of nanotechnology.
Perceptions of risks and beneﬁts
Theweighingofrisksandbeneﬁtsofanewtechnology
is a key component of making policy decisions. More
restrictive regulations could limit potential beneﬁts,
and less restrictive regulations couldexpose the public
touncertainrisks.Therefore,weexpectthescientistsin
our sample to rely partly on their perceived risks and
beneﬁts of nanotechnology when making decisions
about the regulation of the ﬁeld. Previous research
studies on both the public and nanoscientists have
found that overall both groups have higher perceived
beneﬁts of nanotechnology than perceived risks (Bes-
ley et al. 2008; Cobb and Macoubrie 2004).
Yet, the potential risks (some known and many
still unknown) associated with nanotechnology
research and applications make the regulation of the
ﬁeld even more urgent. Echoing the emphasis on
potential risks posed by nanotechnology, Besley et al.
(2008) found that scientists’ risk perceptions are
closely related to their ‘‘perceived importance and
adequacy of regulation.’’ In particular, they argued
that in the areas of human health and environment
(where the perceived risk is highest), the perceived
need for regulation was also quite strong.
Several scholars have compared the public’s
perception of nanotechnology risks and beneﬁts with
scientists’ perspectives (Scheufele et al. 2007; Sie-
grist et al. 2007b). Siegrist et al. (2007b) found that
scientists generally perceive less risk than lay people.
Furthermore, they noted that the contributing factors
to nanotechnology risk perceptions differ for these
two groups. According to their research, while levels
of trust, perceived beneﬁts, and general attitudes
toward technology affect lay people’s perception of
nanotechnology risk levels, knowledge and conﬁ-
dence in governmental agencies play more important
roles in inﬂuencing nanoscientists’ perception of
nanotechnology risks. Some recent studies, however,
have found that nanotechnology might be one of the
ﬁrst emerging technologies for which scientists are
more concerned about some environmental and
health risks than the public (Scheufele et al. 2007).
When conceptualizing the relationships between
risks and the regulatory system, scholars have often
differentiated between various levels of risks and
regulation derived from diverse nanotechnology
development and applications. For example, Renn
and Roco (2006, p. 154) categorized the development
of nanotechnology into four phases, evolving from
‘‘passive nanostructures,’’ ‘‘active nanostructures,’’ to
‘‘systems of nanosystems,’’ and ‘‘molecular nanosys-
tems.’’ They noted that there should be different risk
governance frames for different types of risks that
originate from different stages of nanotechnology
development. Here, we explore how scientists’ risk
and beneﬁt perceptions about nanotechnology impact
their support for the regulation of the ﬁeld.
Social and economic values
Several studies have found that existing value frames
impact people’s support of regulation. Kunreuther
and Slovic (1996) explored the complex societal
values underlying risk assessment. Several other
scholars have argued for placing the discussion of
risk assessment and regulation of nanotechnology
within a broader social context. Renn and Roco
(2006) demonstrated that the governance of nano-
technology should be considered within a broader
social context because rational ‘‘risk assessment’’ is
not sufﬁcient and should be accompanied by a
‘‘concern assessment’’ by experts, politicians, and
the general public (Renn and Roco 2006, p. 169). The
need for a ‘‘concern assessment’’ is particularly high
when there are few rational risk assessment results
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nanotechnology research right now). Since the
assessment of risk for regulation is a social and
cultural process, involving value choices, analytical
tools, and measures accepted by the public (Kunreu-
ther and Slovic 1996), we include a measure of
political/social values in our models.
We also include measures of economic values in
our models because nanotechnology is a ﬁeld that has
large potential for commercial applications and
technology transfer. Economic values could be
important considerations when we think about lim-
iting economic opportunities with a regulatory
framework. Some scholars have assumed that the
failure to provide a comprehensive regulation system
for nanotechnology results partly from the fact that
nanotechnology has signiﬁcant potential economic
value, and therefore, policy-makers might be reluc-
tant to let regulation stiﬂe the development of
commercial applications in the ﬁeld (Bowman and
Hodge 2006).
Methodology
Data collection
The data for this study came from the ﬁrst nationally
representative study of nanoscientists, and were
collected between May and June 2007. The survey
was conducted by mail and it focused on collecting
data from 363 leading U.S. nanotechnology scientists
and engineers. The survey was administered by the
University of Wisconsin Survey Center in three
waves following Dillman’s Tailored Design Method
(Dillman et al. 2008). The ﬁnal response rate for the
nanoscientist survey was 39.5% (AAPOR RR-3:
39.5%). The sampling design was based on identify-
ing the ﬁrst authors and contact authors for the most
highly cited, recent nanotechnology publications that
were indexed in the ISI Web of Knowledge database.
In order to rigorously establish which publications
were actually within the multidisciplinary ﬁeld of
nanotechnology, we drew on work by another group
in the Center for Nanotechnology in Society at
Arizona State University (CNS-ASU) that is tasked
with reﬁning the deﬁnition of nanotechnology using
speciﬁc bibliometric terms. A detailed description of
this group’s reﬁnement process for nanotechnology
search terms is outlined in an article by Porter and
colleagues (Porter et al. 2008).
In order to develop the ﬁnal sample for the scientist
survey, Porter and colleagues delivered to our team a
database of 91,479 nanotechnology publications that
were published between January 2005 and July 2006.
Weﬁlteredtheserecordstoremovenon-U.S.-afﬁliated
scientists, graduate students, and ﬁrst or contact
authors who were cited less than ﬁve times in the
publicationdatabase.Thisﬁlteringprocesswasusedto
ensure that the survey sample focused on the most
highly cited, most active, U.S.-afﬁliated scientists
within the nanotechnology ﬁeld. The ﬁnal ﬁltering
process produced 1,022 names, and this yielded 363
completed questionnaires.
As Table 1 illustrates, 86% of all the respondents
were male, 46% had tenured academic positions, 6%
worked in industry, 80% had current research
supported by an individual government grant or
contract, 27% had current research supported by a
grant from industry, and 26% were supported by
grants from both government and industry. This
shows that almost all the researchers with industry
support also relied on government grants.
The average age for the respondents was about
45 years and the average year for the receipt of a
doctoral degree was 1991. We also observed some
disciplinary diversity among the respondents. The
largest percent of respondents were in the ﬁeld of
chemistry (38%), followed by physics (22%),
Table 1 Descriptive statistics (N = 363)
Mean
Demographic variables
Age 44.94
Male (%) 85.59
Career variables
Year of PhD 1991.21
Tenured (%) 46.28
Supported by grants/contracts (%) 80.17
Field of PhD degree
Chemistry (%) 38.02
Physics (%) 22.31
Engineering (%) 16.53
Materials science (%) 9.64
Biology (%) 6.06
Other (%) 7.44
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biology (6%).
Hypotheses
Previous research has shown that scientists demon-
strate higher levels of support for environmental
regulation (Silva and Jenkins-Smith 2007) and nano-
technology regulation (Besley et al. 2008) when their
risk perceptions are high. Here, we build on the
previous research on nanotechnology regulation
(Besley et al. 2008) by further testing this hypothesis
with a multivariate analysis. We hypothesize that
scientists with higher nanotechnology risk percep-
tions will support higher levels of nanotechnology
regulation. In our analysis, we divide the perceived
risks and beneﬁts into particular application areas.
Our decision to include these particular nanotechnol-
ogy areas in our analysis is based on the previous
research that has shown that perceptions about
nanotechnology are dependent on the speciﬁc appli-
cation of the technology (Kuzma et al. 2008; Siegrist
et al. 2007a). Our second hypothesis is related to the
relationship between scientists’ perceived beneﬁts
and their support for regulation. We expect that as
nanoscientists have higher perceptions about the
beneﬁts of nanotechnology, they will support lower
levels of regulation to allow those beneﬁts to be
realized through academic and commercial research.
Our ﬁnal hypothesis is related to scientists’ values
about the societal allocation of risk. Silva and
Jenkins-Smith (2007) argued that for modeling
regulation, it is important to include a control
variable that captures scientists’ perceptions about
how risk in a society should be allocated and whether
individual citizens should be exposed to risks if there
are potentially large social gains as a result of the
risks. In order to capture a measure of this societal
allocation of risk, we included the following state-
ment as a control variable in our analysis: ‘‘Advanc-
ing nanotechnology quickly is more important than
protecting society from the unknown risks.’’
(1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree). There-
fore, as scientists report higher ratings on this scale,
they are more likely to think that it is acceptable
for individuals in society to accept potential risks if
the payoff is large for nanotechnology. Based on
the ﬁndings by Silva and Jenkins-Smith (2007)
on climate change and radiation protection, we
hypothesize that higher levels of societal allocation
of risk will be correlated with lower levels of support
for regulation.
Results
Our ﬁrst hypothesis was that scientists with higher
risk perceptions would be more supportive of nano-
technology regulation. We tested this hypothesis in
two ways using our dataset. The ﬁrst way was by
comparing the nanotechnology application areas
where scientists had the highest risk perceptions with
the areas where they believed that new regulations
were needed. The results in the second half of
Table 2 present the mean response for the scientists’
risk perceptions across eight areas: overall risk,
human health, privacy, terrorists, environmental,
arms race, loss of jobs, and tiny robots. These results
illustrate that the speciﬁc nanotechnology application
areas for which scientists have the highest percep-
tions of risk are human health, privacy, terrorists, and
the environment.
Next, we compared these areas of high risk
perceptions with the areas that the scientists felt had
insufﬁcient nanotechnology regulations. In order to
capture this, we asked the respondents to report
whether they believed that ‘‘current regulations were
sufﬁcient’’ or ‘‘new regulations were needed’’ (on a
5-point Likert-type scale) for eight different areas of
nanotechnology applications: cosmetics, military,
medicine, bioengineering, environment, computers,
privacy, and other consumer products. The partici-
pants’ mean responses to these eight questions are
presented in Table 3. Out of the eight areas of
nanotechnology applications, the scientists believed
that the four areas that most needed new regulations
(i.e., for which current regulations were not sufﬁ-
cient) were privacy, human enhancement, the med-
ical ﬁeld, and the environment. Interestingly, these
are also the areas for which the scientists had the
highest risk perceptions. On the other hand, military/
defense and machines/computers were the two areas
where the scientists were most likely to think that
current regulations were sufﬁcient.
We further tested this hypothesis (as well as our
second and third hypotheses) using a multivariate
analysis for the relationship between the support for
regulation and risk perceptions, beneﬁt perceptions
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a hierarchical OLS regression model with three
blocks of variables. The ﬁrst block was a set of
demographic variables that included gender, disci-
plinary ﬁeld, and political/social values. The second
block included a general measure for nanotechnology
risk perceptions and a general measure for nanotech-
nology beneﬁt perceptions. The third block included
speciﬁc application areas for nanotechnology risk and
beneﬁt perceptions. The dependent variable for our
analysis was the summative index of two statements:
(1) ‘‘Academic nanotechnology research should be
Table 2 Summary statistics for regulation and risk/beneﬁt perception variables
Response categories: (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree) Mean SD
Regulation of nanotechnology
‘‘Academic nanotechnology research should be regulated’’ 2.12 1.22
‘‘Commercial nanotechnology research should be regulated’’ 2.96 1.34
Level of regulation of nanotechnology
‘‘Regulations of nanotechnology should be implemented at the local level’’ 2.04 1.17
‘‘Regulations of nanotechnology should be implemented at the national level’’ 3.43 1.23
‘‘Regulations of nanotechnology should be implemented at the international level’’ 3.05 1.37
Risk perceptions
Loss of privacy: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to the loss of personal privacy because of tiny new surveillance devices’’ 2.81 1.21
Lead to arms race: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to an arms race between the U.S. and other countries’’ 2.27 1.16
Used by terrorists: ‘‘Nanotech may be used by terrorists against the U.S.’’ 2.69 1.21
Lead to human health problems: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to new human health problems’’ 2.96 1.06
Lead to more pollution: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to more pollution and environmental contamination’’ 2.62 1.06
Loss of U.S. jobs: ‘‘Because of nanotech we may lose more U.S. jobs’’ 1.85 0.98
Spread of tiny robots: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to the uncontrollable spread of very tiny self-replicating robots’’ 1.51 0.90
Beneﬁt perceptions
Treating diseases: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to new and better ways to treat and detect human diseases’’ 2.96 1.06
Clean environment: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to new and better ways to clean up the environment’’ 2.81 1.21
Improve human abilities: ‘‘Nanotech may give scientists the ability to improve human physical and mental abilities’’ 2.69 1.21
Improve national security: ‘‘Nanotech may help us develop increased national security and defensive capabilities’’ 2.62 1.06
Solve energy problems: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to technologies that will help solve our energy problems’’ 2.27 1.16
Revolutionize computer industry: ‘‘Nanotech may revolutionize the computer industry’’ 1.85 0.98
Lead to economic boom: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to a new economic boom’’ 1.51 0.90
Table 3 Summary statistics for adequacy of existing nanotechnology regulations
Thinking about applications of nanotechnology in each of the following areas, please indicate to which degree you think current
regulations are sufﬁcient or we need new regulations to address the new realities created by nanotechnology
1 = Current regulations
are sufﬁcient (%)
2 (%) 3 (%) 4 (%) 5 = We need new
regulations (%)
Surveillance and privacy 14.4 13.2 27.3 19.5 25.5
Biological engineering/human enhancement 12.5 9.7 23.1 31.6 23.1
Medical ﬁeld 14.5 13.3 27.1 27.4 17.8
Environment and energy 17.2 13.6 29.8 22.9 16.6
Military and defense 19.1 13.7 29.5 21.6 16.1
Cosmetics 17.9 16.7 25.5 24.0 15.8
Machines and computers 35.1 20.1 27.9 9.9 6.9
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agree) and (2) ‘‘Commercial nanotechnology research
should be regulated’’ (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 =
Strongly agree).
The results for our OLS model are presented in
Table 4. The before-entry Betas are presented in
Table 4 for each block. The results demonstrate that
the demographic variables account for 15.7% of the
variance in the nanoscientists’ support for regulation of
nanotechnology. Wealsoincludedcontrol variables for
gender and scientiﬁc discipline based on their impor-
tance in previous research on nanotechnology. Powell
(2007) found that the way scientists view nanotechno-
logy risks can depend on the type of research they
conduct and their disciplinary ﬁelds. Siegrist et al.
(2008) found gender differences in the perceived
beneﬁtsaboutnanotechnology.Thenegativecoefﬁcient
on gender in our model indicates that male scientists
were less supportive of regulation than their female
peers. We also observed some interesting disciplinary
differences for the support of regulation. The materials
scientists in the sample were more supportive of
regulation than any other discipline in the sample.
An analysis of the political and social ideology
variables conﬁrms our third hypothesis. Higher levels
of societal allocation of risk were associated with less
support for regulation. Therefore, as nanoscientists
think that the public should be willing to accept more
risks for potential societal beneﬁts, they are less
supportive of nanotechnology regulation. We further
examined social values by including economic and
social conservatism variables in our model. As
previously mentioned, several scholars have found
that scientists often use normative values when
making decisions about risk, just as the public does
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Plutzer et al. 1998;
Slovic et al. 1995). As Kunreuther and Slovic (1996)
and others (Kahan et al. 2008; Renn and Roco 2006)
have argued, value choices are unavoidable in the
process of forming risk and regulation perspectives.
Also, research has shown that people consider eco-
nomic development opportunities when they think
about regulating nanotechnology (Bowman and
Hodge 2006). While social conservatism was not
signiﬁcant, economic conservatism was negatively
correlated with support for regulation. More econom-
icallyconservativenanoscientistswere lesssupportive
Table 4 Hierarchical OLS regression analysis for regulation
of nanotechnology
a
Before-entry b
Demographics and values
Disciplinary ﬁelds and gender
Male -0.11*
Biology -0.07
Physics 0.02
Engineering -0.03
Materials sciences 0.11*
Other disciplines -0.05
Political/social ideology
Economic conservatism
b -0.19**
Social conservatism
c 0.07
Societal allocation of risk
d -0.23**
Incremental R
2 (in %) 15.7**
Overall perceived risks and beneﬁts
Overall risk perception
e 0.26**
Overall beneﬁt perception
f 0.04
Incremental R
2 (in %) 6.8**
Risks and Beneﬁts in Application Areas
Risk perceptions
Loss of privacy
g 0.14**
Lead to arms race
h 0.18**
Lead to health problems
i 0.17**
Used by terrorists
j 0.14**
Loss of U.S. jobs
k 0.07
Spread of tiny robots
l 0.20**
Lead to more pollution
m 0.12*
Beneﬁt perceptions
Treating diseases
n -0.09**
Clean environment
o -0.03
Improve human abilities
p 0.13*
Improve national security
q -0.05
Solve energy problems
r -0.04
Revolutionize computers
s -0.06
Lead to economic boom
t 0.04
Incremental R
2 (in %) 9.4**
Total R
2 (in %) 31.8**
Note:*p\0.05; ** p\0.01
a The dependent variable for the model is the summative index
of ‘‘Academic nanotechnology research should be regulated’’
and ‘‘Commercial nanotechnology research should be
regulated.’’ The response categories for each statement are
1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree. (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.766)
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123of nanotechnology regulation. Even though some
scientists might argue that they make objective
decisions about their areas of expertise, clearly the
leading U.S. nanoscientists make policy suggestions
about their ﬁelds by viewing the issue through their
individual economic value frames. Since one of the
main reasons for governmental regulation is the
existence of market failure, if scientists perceive that
the market is the most efﬁcient mechanism for the
development of technology, they might be less
supportive of regulation.
The second block of variables in our OLS
regression included overall risk and beneﬁt percep-
tion measures. These two variables explained an
additional 6.8% of the variance in the model. The
results demonstrate that our ﬁrst hypothesis was
conﬁrmed for the overall risk perceptions, but our
second hypothesis was not conﬁrmed for overall
beneﬁt perceptions. As nanoscientists had higher risk
perceptions, they were more supportive of nanotech-
nology regulation. We were surprised to ﬁnd, how-
ever, that beneﬁt perceptions were not signiﬁcantly
correlated with support for nanotechnology. This
ﬁnding demonstrates that the public and scientists use
different heuristics when they are asked to make
decisions about nanotechnology. As previously men-
tioned, Scheufele and Lewenstein (2005) found that
the public uses cognitive shortcuts to make policy-
related decisions about nanotechnology because they
have little information about the scientiﬁc details. In
addition, they argued that these cognitive shortcuts
are often provided by the way the media portrays the
Table 4 continued
b ‘‘In terms of economic issues, would you say you are:___’’
(1 = Very liberal; 7 = Very conservative)
c ‘‘In terms of social issues, would you say you are:___’’
(1 = Very liberal; 7 = Very conservative)
d Societal allocation of risk variable is based on the response
to the following survey question: ‘‘Advancing nanotechnology
quickly is more important than protecting society from the
unknown risks’’ (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
e Overall risk perceptions are based on response to the
following survey question: ‘‘Nanotechnology is risky for
society’’ (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
f Overall beneﬁt perceptions are based on response to the
following survey question: ‘‘Nanotechnology is useful for
society’’ (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
g Risk perception about Privacy is based on the response to the
following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to the loss of
personal privacy because of tiny new surveillance devices’’
(1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
h Risk perception about Arms Race is based on the response to
the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to an arms
race between the U.S. and other countries’’ (1 = Strongly
disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
i Risk perception about Human Health is based on the response
to the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to new
human health problems’’ (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly
agree)
j Risk perception about Terrorists is based on the response to
the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech may be used by
terrorists against the U.S.’’ (1 = Strongly disagree;
5 = Strongly agree)
k Risk perception about Loss of Jobs is based on the response
to the following survey question: ‘‘Because of nanotech we
may lose more U.S. jobs.’’ (1 = Strongly disagree;
5 = Strongly agree)
l Risk perception about Tiny Robots is based on the response
to the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to the
uncontrollable spread of very tiny self-replicating robots’’
(1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
m Risk perception about Environment is based on the response
to the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech may lead to more
pollution and environmental contamination’’ (1 = Strongly
disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
n Beneﬁt perception about Treating Diseases is based on the
response to the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech may lead
to new and better ways to treat and detect human diseases’’
(1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
o Beneﬁt perception about Clean Environment is based on the
response to the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech may lead
to new and better ways to clean up the environment’’
(1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
p Beneﬁt perception about Improve Human Abilities is based
on the response to the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech
may give scientists the ability to improve human physical &
mental abilities’’ (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
Table 4 continued
q Beneﬁt perception about Improve National Security is based
on the response to the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech
may help us develop increased national security and defensive
capabilities’’ (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
r Beneﬁt perception about Solve Energy Problems is based on
the response to the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech may
lead to technologies that will help solve our energy problems’’
(1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
s Beneﬁt perception about Revolutionize Computer Industry is
based on the response to the following survey question:
‘‘Nanotech may revolutionize the computer industry’’
(1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
t Beneﬁt perception about Lead to Economic Boom is based on
the response to the following survey question: ‘‘Nanotech may
lead to a new economic boom’’ (1 = Strongly disagree;
5 = Strongly agree)
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123issue of nanotechnology (i.e., media framing) since
media coverage of nanotechnology in the USA has
been largely focused on the potential beneﬁts of the
ﬁeld rather than the potential risks (Gaskell et al.
2004). Thus, Scheufele and Lewenstein (2005) found
that the public used beneﬁt perceptions, but not risk
perceptions, when making decisions about nanotech-
nology. Our results for the nanoscientists are in
contrast to the earlier results for the public’s heuris-
tics, with nanoscientists relying on their risk percep-
tions but not beneﬁt perceptions. We speculate that
the nanoscientists might view regulations as protec-
tions for the public (and therefore focus on the
potential risks), while the public might think of
regulations as restricting their access to nanotechno-
logy beneﬁts (and therefore focus on the potential
beneﬁts). Clearly, these are contrasting ways of
thinking about nanotechnology and its potential
beneﬁts and risks.
The third block of our OLS regression model
included a series of risk perception variables and
beneﬁt perception variables for speciﬁc nanotechnol-
ogy application areas. These variables explained an
additional 9.4% of the variance in the nanoscientists’
support for regulation. The results for the risk
perceptions further conﬁrmed our ﬁrst hypothesis.
Risk perceptions for all nanotechnology application
areas except one (loss of U.S. jobs) were signiﬁ-
cantly—and positively—correlated with support for
nanotechnology regulation. Thus, as perceptions of
risk increased for privacy, defense, human health,
terrorists, tiny robots, and environment, nanoscien-
tists’ support for regulation increased. The standard-
ized coefﬁcients show that the two risk application
areas that had the strongest relationship with support
for regulation were defense and human health.
The results for the beneﬁt perceptions were similar
to those for the previous block with only two beneﬁt
perceptions being signiﬁcantly correlated with sup-
port for regulation: treating diseases and improving
human abilities. As the nanoscientists perceived
higher beneﬁts for treating diseases, they were less
supportive of nanotechnology regulation. The rela-
tionship for the beneﬁt of improving human abilities
was in the opposite direction. As the nanoscientists
perceived more nanotech beneﬁts related to improv-
ing human abilities, they were more supportive of
nanotechnology regulations. We speculate that this
result, combined with the above result about risks
related to human health, means that the nanoscientists
are particularly concerned about how nanotechnology
will impact human health. While they were con-
cerned about risks related to human health and this
led to more support for regulation, they are also
concerned about beneﬁts related to improving human
abilities. We speculate that this is because the
nanoscientists are not sure that the beneﬁts related
to improving human abilities will be held in check
without governmental regulations. Therefore, while
they see this as a potentially beneﬁcial area, they are
concerned about how those beneﬁts might play out in
the absence of stricter regulations. Thus, as they
perceive higher potential beneﬁts, they are more
supportive of having regulations in place that could
limit accompanying negative impacts on human
health.
In addition to testing our three formal hypotheses,
we found some other noteworthy results. First, the
summary statistics for the regulation variables in
Table 2 demonstrate that the scientists were slightly
more supportive of regulating commercial nanotech-
nology than they were for regulating academic
nanotechnology. Perhaps this is related to the fact
that commercial nanotechnology research is often
directly related to product development and the use of
nanotechnology by consumers. Second, nanoscien-
tists were most supportive of national level nano-
technology regulations, with the international level
coming in second (see Table 2). This is another
interesting ﬁnding because recent study by Scheufele
et al. (2009) demonstrates that people in different
countries have different perceptions about the moral
acceptability of nanotechnology. Therefore, it is quite
possible that national level policies could differ
signiﬁcantly across countries (Marchant and Sylves-
ter 2006; Tyshenko and Krewski 2008). If a nano-
technology regulatory framework is adopted that is
not internationally implemented, then companies
might simply move their products and research to
countries with less stringent regulations.
Conclusions
Our data provide the ﬁrst nationally generalizable
assessment of attitudes and regulatory views among
leading U.S. nanoscientists. As we outlined earlier,
systematic feedback from scientists similar to the one
1582 J Nanopart Res (2009) 11:1573–1585
123provided in our study is absolutely critical during
policy debates that are characterized by a noticeable
absence of conclusive evidence on the concrete risks
connected with emerging technologies. Toward that
end, our results provide a number of concrete pieces
of advice for policy makers who are planning to use
input from nanoscientists in their plans for nanotech-
nology regulation.
The ﬁrst policy implication from our data is that
the leading U.S. nanoscientists believe that we most
urgently need new regulations in the areas of
surveillance/privacy, human enhancement, medicine,
and the environment. Instead of focusing time and
energy on new regulations in other areas where
nanoscientists would argue that current regulations
are largely sufﬁcient (like machines and computers),
policy-makers should focus their policy development
efforts on these higher priority areas. This ﬁnding is
particularly relevant, given the current piecemeal
nature of the regulatory framework for nanotech. As
resources and time constraints make the formation of
new nanotechnology policies increasingly difﬁcult,
policy-makers should focus ﬁrst on regulating the
areas where leading nanoscientists see the highest
risk and the most need for regulation.
The second implication is related to the differences
in the way scientists and the public make policy
decisions about nanotechnology. Even though we do
not compare scientist and public survey data in this
research, we have discussed a similar study that
focused on the heuristics that the public uses when
discussing nanotechnology (Scheufele and Lewen-
stein 2005). We can utilize these earlier results to
draw some conclusions about the way the public
thinks about nanotechnology policy decisions, and to
compare them with our ﬁndings about how scientists
make policy decisions about nanotechnology. Scheuf-
ele and Lewenstein (2005) found that the public tends
to rely on their perceived beneﬁts (rather than
perceived risks) when making decisions about nano-
technology. Yet, in this study, we found that nano-
scientists tend to make decisions about the need for
nanotechnology regulation based on perceived risks
and political/economic values. This distinction could
be important for policy-makers if they are planning to
include both nanoscientists and the public in the
policy-making process. Clearly, the public and
scientists rely on different cognitive shortcuts when
they think about the regulation of nanotechnology.
Third, our ﬁndings highlight the importance of
developing a systematic understanding of the demo-
graphic antecedents among policy perceptions for
nanoscientists. In particular, our analyses show that
economic conservatism among scientists was related to
less support for regulation, and that more economically
liberal scientists—in turn—were more likely to support
regulations.Thefactthatviewsonregulationamongthe
leading U.S. nanoscientists is driven by personal
ideologies—even after also controlling for their scien-
tiﬁc judgment about potential risks and beneﬁts—may
be troublesome to some observers, especially since
journalists and policymakers alike routinely turn to
experts from the research community when they need
information on nanoscience and regulation.
Finally, since nanoscientists’ support for nano-
technology regulation is signiﬁcantly related to their
risk perceptions, it will be important for policy-
makers to continually include scientists in their
decision-making processes about developing new
(and reﬁning old) policies for nanotechnology. We
speculate that as additional risk assessment data
become available—and, therefore, as nanoscientists’
perceptions about the risks of nanotech evolve—their
support for the regulation of nanotechnology will also
change. Policy-makers should not assume that nano-
scientists have a static view of the regulation of their
ﬁeld. Thus, a long-term regulatory framework for
nanotechnology should allow for scientists’ changing
risk perceptions, the public’s changing beneﬁt per-
ceptions, as well as updated rational risk assessment
data as it becomes available over time.
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